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Collective representations are the result of an immense coop-
eration, which stretches out not only into space but into time 
as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, 
united and combined their ideas and sentiments: for them, 
long generations have accumulated their experience and their 
knowledge. A special intellectual activity is therefore concen-
trated in them, which is in!nitely richer and complexer than 
that of the individual.
 (Émile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the 
 Religious Life, [1912] 1965: 29)
"e languages and folkways of ancient peoples hold little relevance for us, 
except in one respect: the religions of the ancient world remain our reli-
gions. "ough religions change, core features of the scriptures and ritu-
als of the world’s most popular religious traditions appear to have been 
conserved with remarkably high !delity. We explain slow religious change 
from how religion facilitates cooperation at large social scales. At the end, 
we clarify how historians of religion, in collaboration with psychologists 
and computational biologists, might test and improve explanations such 
as ours.
COOPERATION AND RELIGION
An evolutionary problem of cooperation
Why do humans cooperate? "at evolutionary scholars should !nd this 
question interesting might perplex some religious studies scholars. "e 
bene!ts of cooperation are familiar. Yet, as "omas Hobbes observed, 
these bene!ts are fragile, and cooperative exchange requires mechanisms 
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for social order. Hobbes imagines life “in a state of nature” lacking such 
ordering mechanisms as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 
1651: pt 1, ch. 13). According to Hobbes, humans have managed to 
improve on the state of nature by creating governing institutions, which 
require that individuals:
confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one 
assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality 
of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint 
one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person … "is is 
the generation of that great leviathan, or rather, to speak 
more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the 
immortal God, our peace and defence.  (Ibid.: pt 2, ch. 17)
Yet there is a problem with the evolutionary logic of Hobbes’s presumed 
mechanism. "e problem centres on the evolutionary stability of individual 
consent. Where theft of a cooperative bene!t is possible, “common inter-
ests” do not exist independently of protection mechanisms. Rather, mani-
fold individual interests exist, and these overlap only to varying degrees. 
Common interests must be forged and maintained. If individuals were to 
grant their power and strength to governments, then what will prevent 
those who govern from exploiting this power for sel!sh gain? Some expla-
nation for the evolutionary emergence and stability of cooperative institu-
tions is therefore needed.
Worries about the stability of cooperative institutions are hardly 
new. "e Roman author Juvenal famously asked, “Quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes?”—“Who will guard our guardians?” (Juvenal, Satires 6.347–8). 
Juvenal worried about the chaperoning of wives, but the question applies 
quite generally. "e general version of “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?” 
appeared earlier in Plato’s Republic, an extended re+ection on the question 
of how a good society may be established. Plato’s answer imagines a Utopia 
run by virtuous philosophers who deceive. According to Plato, such philos-
ophers will understand that the bene!ts of political order demand plausible 
but false mythologies. A population must be made to believe, without any 
natural justi!cation, that civic authority is justi!ed. Plato sought a solution 
from deception: “how … may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of 
which we lately spoke—just one Royal Lie which may deceive the rulers, if 
that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?” (Plato, Republic 414b-
c, trans. B. Jowett). Yet expedient lying does not answer “Quis custodiet 
ipsos custodies?” From an evolutionary perspective, wherever incentives to 
exploit cooperation bring !tness advantages, nature will favor those who 
are incredulous of Noble Lies. "at corruption pervades many political 
institutions suggests that the problems of “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?” 
are not trivially solved. "at social order is often established, however, 
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implies that mechanisms have evolved to prevent the warring of all against 
all. What are these mechanisms? What explains their stability over time?
!e folk theory of religion
"e ancients held that religion is conserved because religion supports 
political order. An early expression of this idea possibly comes from 
the fourth-century bce Greek philosopher Critias (quoted by Sextus 
Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 9.54; Diels & Kranz 2001: 88 B 
25). "e idea also appears earlier in the writings of the Chinese philos-
opher Mozi (I. Johnston 2010: ch. 10; for discussion, see Bulbulia 2012). 
Philosophers have been reinventing the cooperation theory ever since 
(Preus 1987). Indeed, the cooperation model is so commonplace that it 
deserves to be called the folk theory of religion.
"e folk theory pervades the evolutionary literatures on religion (Bul-
bulia 2004b; Norenzayan & Shari. 2008: 62; Rappaport 1971). What to 
make of it? Religion is associated with prosociality (see Atkinson & Bour-
rat 2010; Bering 2006; Johnson & Kruger 2004).1 Does religion function to 
cause a political order, or is religion the e.ect of a political order? To sup-
pose that religion causes large-scale cooperation raises the general version 
of Juvenal’s problem for the evolutionary stability of religious cooperation 
mechanisms: why would incredulous defectors not evolve to exploit reli-
gious cooperators for sel!sh gain, eventually driving religious cooperators 
to extinction?
Commitment signalling models of religious cooperation point out that 
religious commitment presents a vision of the nature in which coopera-
tion appears to bene!t the cooperative (Bulbulia & Sosis 2011).2 "ose 
who believe in this vision will !nd motivations to cooperate.3 Such models 
also point out that religious commitment is di/cult-to-fake. Try, for 
example, presenting an emotion of overwhelming gratitude to Zeus. It 
 1. Unfortunately, religious cooperation does not always extend beyond the boundaries 
of a religious group. Indeed, religious cooperation sometimes fuels con+icts. Such 
con+icts are not wars of all against all, but rather wars of us against them. Evolution 
does not care about moral perfection. It rather blindly favors designs that foster sur-
vival and reproduction. We should, then, follow Darwin, who distinguished concepts 
of moral goodness from the e.ects of natural selection (Darwin [1874] 1989). Our 
point here is to understand the mechanisms by which cooperation evolves, allowing 
that morality is a separate question.
 2. “Commitment signalling” is sometimes called “costly signalling.” Strictly speaking, 
however, hard-to-fake signals need not be costly.
 3. "e faithful may cooperation from a desire to avoid supernatural punishments or 
from an inherent desire to please the gods, or both. Bene!ts may be perceived as 
extrinsic or intrinsically rewarding, or combinations thereof.
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is di/cult—though not impossible—to do this convincingly. Over time, 
it will be di/cult to manage this act. Where religious commitments are 
associate with cooperative tendencies hard-to-fake religious displays may 
evolve to signal within-group cooperation (Bulbulia 2004a; Henrich 2009; 
Irons 2001; Mahoney 2008; Sosis 2003). "e idea: religious displays have 
the power to address the stability problem because religious displays relia-
bly identify cooperative commitments by identifying intrinsically or extrin-
sically rewarding commitments supernatural worlds.4
We think that commitment signalling models help to explain how 
religious cooperation supports stable cooperation at small social scales. 
Wherever partners are able to signal and decode each other’s hard-to-fake 
signals of commitment they may e.ectively predict each others cooperative 
actions. Notice however that commitment signalling has di/culty explain-
ing how religion supports cooperation in contexts where person-to-person 
signalling is absent. We call such contexts anonymous exchange. If your 
signals cannot reach anonymous partners, then your signals cannot assure 
your partners of your cooperative commitment—at least not straightfor-
wardly. Likewise, if your partners remain unknown to you, then their coop-
erative signals cannot straightforwardly assess your consciousness, at least 
not straightforwardly. We might stay that anonymous exchange is de!ned 
by signalling blindness. It is uncontroversial that cooperation in large soci-
eties involves substantial amounts of anonymous exchange. Cooperators 
in large social worlds learn to trust the cooperative actions of strangers, 
whose identities remain unknown and whose signals they cannot straight-
forwardly detect (Gil-White & Richerson 2003). How is Plato’s problem 
solved for the exchange that pervades large social worlds? "ose who 
have investigated this problem do not !nd one and only one mechanism 
(Ostrom 2005). Rather cooperation receives support from many and vari-
ous interlocking cooperative designs. We are interesting in whether and 
how religion contributes to large-scale exchange.
COOPERATION’S THREATS FROM INSECURITY
Risky coordination
"e dominant conception of cooperation’s evolutionary problem is that of 
a prisoner’s dilemma, a hypothetical thought experiment that evolutionary 
researchers use to explain how sel!shness may fail a mutually bene!ting 
cooperation. "e thought experiment imagines that potential cooperators 
 4. To evolve, religious signalling need not work infallibly. It need only work reliably 
enough to reward religious cooperators. 
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are in the position of two suspects held for a crime for which they are 
guilty. "e police have o.ered the following deal. If one accomplice talks, 
and the other is silent, the talker will be freed and the silent accomplice 
will get a heavy sentence. If both talk, both will get a moderate sentence. 
Jointly silent partners, the game imagines, will receive only a light sentence. 
Mutual cooperation thus yields the highest average return. However uni-
lateral defection yields the highest individual return, no matter what one’s 
accomplice does. In a world where outcomes translate to !tness advan-
tages, evolutionary dynamics predicts that defection will evolve, despite 
higher average returns from universal cooperation. "e general form of a 
prisoner’s dilemma is called a tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). For 
cooperation to evolve at large social scales, it would appear that an anony-
mous commons must be protected from thieves.
We follow those who challenge the idea that prisoner’s dilemmas are 
the only evolutionary problem that cooperators face (Ostrom 1990; Schell-
ing [1978] 2006). Indeed, we believe that the key to understanding reli-
gion’s support for large-scale cooperation comes from understanding that 
the motivation to cheat cooperation, as in a prisoner’s dilemma, is only a 
special, limiting case of cooperation’s more basic evolutionary problems. 
Another thought experiment called “the stag hunt” reveals a distinct threat 
from risk aversion.
!e stag hunt
Game theorists derive the stag hunt from a parable in Rousseau’s Discourses:
If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realised that 
he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened 
to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he 
would have gone o. in pursuit of it without scruple.
 (Rousseau [1755] 1992: 47)
"ose who hunt stags have no incentive to cheat cooperation. A stag por-
tion pays better than a hare portion. However capturing a stag requires 
cooperation. Capturing a hare does not. In the formal presentation of the 
stag hunt, there are two evolutionary equilibria:5
 1 All cooperate.
 2 All defect.
 5. An equilibrium is a set of behaviors for which any single behavior cannot yield a 
better result, given the behaviors of others. Evolutionary theory de!nes “better” in 
terms of !tness e.ects.
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In a stag hunt, if everyone were to cooperate, a focal partner, “Alice,” could 
do no better than by cooperating as well, thus obtaining her preferred stag 
share. However, if even one partner were to defect from the stag hunt, then 
Alice could do no better than by defecting too. Otherwise Alice would lose 
her hare, with no compensating stag portion. Alice’s strategic problem 
generalizes. If any one should defect then so should all.
Alice’s capacity to represent the thoughts of her partners makes coop-
eration less likely. Alice might be tempted to chase hares merely because 
she suspects that others might chase hares. Others might worry after rep-
resenting Alice’s worry. In thinking about the representations of others, 
Alice might !nd additional worries, and so forth. "e loss of con!dence 
that strategic representation poses for a stag hunt also generalize. Wor-
ries may ramify. Representing risk as pervasively represented elaborates 
increasing risks. Notice that such representations of risk can potentially 
poison the resolve of otherwise risk-averse cooperators. Even if Alice were 
con!dent of her own power for resisting hare temptations the success of 
the stag hunt does not turn on Alice’s resolve. Success rather turns on the 
resolve of the most risk averse member of the minimal group necessary to 
secure cooperation’s advantage. Yet we have noticed that for anonymous 
exchange, partners cannot individually signal their resolve to each other. 
Failures of risky cooperation for anonymous exchange arise from a com-
bination of uncertainty and risk avoidance. "is remains true even though 
there is no sel!sh incentive to cheat successful cooperation. Defection 
in a stag hunt will be motivated from prudence not theft. To defect in a 
stag hunt is no more stealing than avoiding a party you have no reason to 
believe will happen.
What happens when the stag hunt is played in real life? Formal anal-
ysis, simulations, and experimental literatures agree that only the defec-
tion equilibrium is evolutionarily stable (Keizer et al. 2008; Skyrms 2004; 
Van Huyck et al. 1990; Young 1998). "e explanation for the instability of 
the cooperation equilibrium is clear. "ough it takes only one or several 
defectors to destroy a cooperative good, it takes near universal cooperation 
to restore it. After cooperation has failed, moreover, it is unlikely that an 
entire group will simultaneously change their behaviors to favor coopera-
tion. For why will anyone predict that others will change their behaviors?6 
Again, stability in a stag hunt is threatened from failures of con!dence.
 6. It might seem that solutions to the stag hunt would be easily rati!ed, because it is 
in every partner’s best interest to secure universal cooperation. Problems, however, 
abound. Consider a simple dilemma where only two partners face an insecure coop-
eration problem. Imagine that both speak the same language and that both may com-
municate their intentions. Suppose that (1) mutual cooperation pays !ve utiles, (2) 
mutual defection pays three utiles, (3) unilateral defection pays the defector four 
utiles, and the unrequited cooperation loses one utile. "ough neither partner can 
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"e stag hunt is not merely an intellectual curiosity of theoretical econo-
mists. Many social dilemmas assume the character of a stag hunt. A poign-
ant example comes from the obedience of citizens living under repressive 
political regimes. If all were to revolt, tyrants would be toppled. Typically, 
revolt brings few costs to citizens who simultaneously and universally opt 
for revolt. Indeed, where everyone revolts, any individual who persists in 
supporting the ancient regime will face trouble. Alice would happily join 
in a revolution, except for this: how can Alice know that others will also 
revolt? On the other side, Alice knows that those who attempt revolutions 
alone do not fare well. Lacking a clear sign that the revolution will occur, 
Alice and her cohort would be wise to persist with the status quo (for fur-
ther discussion, with examples, see Bulbulia & Schjoedt 2010). Risks and 
uncertainty combine to favor universal defection, even if universal coop-
eration would achieve bene!ts all desire and even though such bene!ts 
cannot be stolen. "e key di.erence between the stag hunt and the pris-
oner’s dilemma, or its larger sibling the tragedy of the commons, is that it 
is in everyone’s best interest to solve a stag hunt.
It is important to notice that solutions to risky coordination problems 
do not hinge on the availability of discrimination mechanisms such as 
commitment signalling systems. "is is fortunate because we have de!ned 
anonymous exchange as situations in which interpersonal signalling is not 
available. Rather, cooperation in a stag hunt may be stabilized where sys-
tems evolve to synchronously modify partner sensibilities. Broadly speak-
ing there are two pathways to widespread and synchronous modi!cation. 
Cooperative sensibilities may be evoked in synchrony (1) from factors that 
widely modify the perceived rewards and risks of cooperation and (2) from 
factors that widely distract attention from the strategic problem (Bulbulia 
2011). If Alice were to value cooperation from some perception of a higher 
intrinsic or extrinsic reward, then she will be motivated to cooperate. Simi-
larly, if Alice fails to notice that there is any risk involved in cooperation, 
then she may also !nd motivations to cooperate. Alice will fail miserable, 
however, unless other partners view cooperation as similarly worthy, in 
synchrony.
If cooperation were in everyone’s best interest, why would risky coor-
dination problems pose a special evolutionary problem? Consider the 
coordinated actions of workers against management in a strike. Employ-
ees share a common interest in cooperating, but unilateral coopera-
tion is damaging. However to enable collective action, trade unions are 
formed, people join, risks are mitigated and we coordinate. "is example 
cheat cooperation, each can do no better than when the other cooperates. It pays 
partners to promise cooperation even when they will not. Verbal assurances are not 
intrinsically reliable (for extensive discussion of this problem see Binmore 2008; 
Rubinstein 1989).
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generalizes. People share an interest in cooperating and learn to trust the 
institutions that manage cooperative problems. Where is the problem? 
"e core problem arises from randomness. Laboratory and !eld experi-
ments show that after coordination fails, information of failure sets up a 
negative feedback loop that elaborates increasingly lower levels of coop-
erative con!dence over time. Randomness can and does perturb our 
coordinating institutions (see Bulbulia 2009). As Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel 
Prize-winning work makes clear, we cannot take the stability of coop-
erative institutions for granted; where cooperative institutions survive, an 
intricate matrix of subtle designs cleverly manages cooperation’s tough 
motivational problems (Ostrom 2005). How might religion support anon-
ymous coordination threatened by risk?
THE CHARISMATIC CALLING MODEL FOR  
RELIGIOUS COOPERATION
Reverse engineering mortal gods
"e core properties of a robust coordination device are as follows:
 1 A synchronous calling mechanism—or “mortal god”—that entrains 
powerful cooperative motivations among partners who are exposed 
to it.
 2 An exposure ecology that connects partners to calling mechanisms. 
Exposure ecologies may recruit spatially and temporally focal place-
ments, what Hobbes calls “one man.” Or exposure ecologies may 
recruit dispersed placements, what Hobbes calls “an assembly of 
men [linked] by plurality of voices, unto one will,” which are dif-
fusely accessible to anonymous partners. Focal and dispersed call-
ing mechanisms must a.ect all partners in synchrony for su/ciently 
long periods of time to e.ect a mutually bene!ting cooperation.
 3 A learning regime, for which cooperative responses to calling systems 
are forged.
We suggest that religious cultures !t the design speci!cations of a robust 
coordination devices. Such designs resist risky coordination’s entropic 
trend by synchronizing and sustaining cooperation motivations among 
partners to anonymous exchange. Religious cultures o.er stable solutions 
because they have evolved to be “charismatic,” loosely in Max Weber’s 
sense of the term, by commanding extraordinarily powerful attention and 
motivations for response (discussed by Bulbulia & Schjoedt 2010). We 
next consider how religious cultures contribute to supporting risky-coop-
eration against coordination’s entropic trend by calling the cooperative 
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motivations of potentially anonymous partners in synchrony, at potentially 
unlimited social scales.7
Evidence of mortal gods: the sacred values literatures
Are there any motivational states that might reliably lead to cooperation in 
risky and uncertain social worlds? It would seem that cooperation is most 
stably assured when cooperative motivations do not depend on a calcu-
lus of rational self-interest. Again, where cooperation is fragile, rational 
partners may defect merely because such partners anticipate that others 
will be risk-averse (Bulbulia & Schjoedt 2010). Sacred values appear to be 
good candidates for providing the motivational states that are needed to 
stabilize cooperative exchange against risk avoidance (Taves 2009). "e 
evidence suggests that sacred values are typically maintained as moral 
absolutes: such values cannot be bought, and they do not yield easily to 
economic or personal risks. As Tetlock observes:
Students of judgment and choice have long paid homage to nor-
mative models of rationality anchored in narrowly utilitarian 
perspectives on human nature: people are posited to be either 
intuitive economists aspiring to maximize utility or intuitive 
scientists trying to discern predictive regularities… Research on 
sacred values suggests a supplementary perspective that posits 
people to be intuitive theologians struggling to defend sacred 
values from secular encroachments.  (Tetlock 2003: 323)
Sacred values combine two critical properties for stabilizing e.ective 
cooperative exchange against risk: such values (1) produce “intuitive the-
ologians” who are insensitive to material rewards (2) support collective 
goals.8
 7. We do not use “calling” in Weber’s sense of this term, because for Weber “calling” 
is restricted to Protestant Christianity. We regard the calling capacity of religious 
cultures to be an evolved property of successful religious cultures, Protestant or 
otherwise.
 8. Notably, sacred values do not lead to the rigid pursuit of !xed goals, which would 
render them harmful in worlds where strategic circumstances are liable to change. 
Evidence for such strategic +exibility comes from a recent study conducted on the 
West Bank, where Ginges and Colleagues found an abundance of moral absolutists, 
among both Palestinians and Jewish participants, who reacted with outrage and moral 
disgust to political proposals o.ering cash trades for sacredly valued land (Ginges et 
al. 2007). Such moral absolutists were also found to exhibit a much higher tolerance 
for violence in response to such proposals. Yet while participants tended to frame 
their values in absolute terms, such framing did not produce strategic in+exibility. 
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Knowing nothing else, then, factors coordinate the expression of sacred 
values would appear to possess the motivational qualities of a Hobbesian 
mortal god. Partners bound by common sacred values will tend not to 
think about cooperation as a means to some personal end, but will rather 
tend to act for cooperation as “intuitive theologians,” throwing calculation 
to the wind.
!e synchronization of durable value states  
through calling cultures
We have noticed that the production of sacred values alone will not be be 
su/cient to support reliable cooperative exchange: cooperation must also 
be synchronously expressed across the relevant exchange group, and must 
also endure for su/ciently long to generate mutually bene!ting coopera-
tive behavior. Do religious institutions function to align the cooperative 
motivations of members of exchange groups? "e conjecture that sacred 
rituals function as exquisite coordination devices has formed the basis of 
much functional speculations about religions. For example, Durkheim 
writes:
if collective life awakens religious when it rises to a certain 
intensity, that is so because it brings about a state of e.erves-
cence that alters the conditions of the psychic activity … we feel 
somehow transformed and in consequence transform our sur-
roundings.  (Durkheim [1912] 1965: 24)
While there is some preliminary quantitative evidence for the coopera-
tive of sacred rituals (reviewed by Bulbulia & Reddish 2012), Durkheim’s 
conjecture remains largely untested.9 Testing this hypothesis is an area for 
intensive collaboration between anthropologists of religion and psychol-
ogists of religion. "e charismatic calling model is interesting because it 
suggests a mechanism for the conservation of any such e.ects.
In conditions where opposing sides respectfully acknowledged each other’s sacred 
values, and expressed sincere regret for past o.ences, tolerance for violence declined 
(see also Fiske & Tetlock 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000).
 9. In a study of nine naturally occurring rituals, we found that, the most powerful coop-
erative e.ects from rituals that combine synchronous movements with sacred values 
(see Fischer et al. 2013).
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THE TEXTUAL HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR  
EVOLUTIONARY MODELS OF RELIGION
Qualitative historical evidence for the charismatic model
Core features of the most popular religious cultures appear to have been 
conserved with remarkable !delity. "ough the myth of the perennial tra-
dition that remains unchanging over time is deservedly challenged (Stout 
1981), it is nevertheless interesting that certain religious symbols, texts, 
and rites survive relatively intact over long temporal spans (Bulbulia 2009). 
Indeed, the central elements of the world’s dominant religions have lasted 
for centuries. "e charismatic calling model throws explanatory light on 
the strong conservation of sacred cultures, by revealing functional bene!ts 
from high-!delity transmission mechanisms.
 1 Fidelity enables success frames. An abiding tradition o.ers a hard-
to-fake signal of its power for organizing cooperative solutions. A 
tradition’s long success supports optimism for overcoming current 
risks. We have been through worse. "e age of a tradition is its cur-
riculum vitae. Even activists who seek change will often appeal the 
prophetic and revolutionary stories of a tradition’s past. Examples 
abound: Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, the liberation the-
ology movement, and others. Faithful transmission of old traditions 
a.ords a success frame from the past, set in a cosmic perspective, 
from which motivations against risk avoidance may be evoked. 
Relatedly, memorializing a tradition’s most humbling defeats enables 
partners to appreciate the resilience of their tradition for overcoming 
failures. "e idea:
Our tradition has survived failures. Our forebears have 
recovered from worse. We can recover from any defeat 
except perhaps the loss of our tradition, to which our defec-
tion will contribute. If such a tradition is lost, however, 
what evidence will we have for our ability to overcome 
present risks? By what standard will we judge such risks as 
surmountable?
  "e answers to such questions are not clear, and the representation 
of this doubt can plausibly motivate cascading declines in coopera-
tive con!dence. Finally, re+ecting on the past may also elicit intrinsic 
commitments for cooperation from feelings of indebtedness to past 
cohorts whose sacri!ces have enabled our existence and persistence.
 2 Restraint of authority. Where the decisions of political authorities are 
associated with supernatural realities, political authority may receive 
additional motivational support from justi!cations that transcend 
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human interests. Robert Bellah and others have argued that political 
elites use religion to verify submission to a higher law, as a kind of 
virtue signalling device (see Bellah 1967). Evidence for strong submis-
sion to charismatic authority comes from brain imaging machines. 
Schjoedt and colleagues have demonstrated that audiences tend to 
cede control to traditional authorities merely because an authority 
holds an o/ce, irrespective of any special virtue signalling (Schjoedt 
et al. 2011). "e authors point out that such e.ects bear a striking 
resemblance to hypnotic e.ects. "e hypnotic control of traditional 
o/ces is well explained as a component of a mortal god. Such dis-
positions to authority may coordinate cooperative responses among 
participants who remain personally unknown to each other, yet who 
are nevertheless linked to focal authorities, in whom they share a 
common con!dence.
 3 Positive externalities. As cooperative networks grow, unfamiliar part-
ners will pro!t whenever they are motivated by the same (or simi-
lar) symbolic, ritual, and ecological arrays. Such arrays are similar 
to monetary instruments, document formats, USB ports, and other 
technologies, which are e.ective only when commonly shared. 
Economists call the bene!ts of shared conventions and technolo-
gies positive externalities. "e charismatic model predicts that the 
demands of similarity will tend to constrain religious innovation, 
particularly where cooperative worlds are both large and risky. Even 
where sacred cultures are ine/cient, the norms that favor conser-
vation may be retained for their bene!ts in reducing symbolic vari-
ation. "e demands of local !delity will plausibly yield historical 
e.ects, slowing the rate of change for religious cultures. What is the 
relative rate of change for religious culture, compared to other types 
of culture? "is answer is unknown. Teams of historians and life sci-
entists are needed to estimate such relative rates of change.
TEXTUAL HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND A SCIENCE OF RELIGIONS
What to make of the charismatic model? No model should hope to 
account for everything about religion. As Boyer has long urged, the natu-
ralistic study of religion has no room for magic bullet explanations (Boyer 
2002a). "e model we have presented here is interesting because it relates 
the puzzle of large-scale cooperation and the puzzle of religious conser-
vation under a common explanation. "e hypothesis that religious minds 
and cultures interact to assure mutual cooperative exchange by calling 
cooperative motivations in synchrony may go part of the way to explaining 
how the di/cult problem of assuring otherwise insecure cooperation in 
large social worlds. We conclude by discussing how teams of historians of 
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religion and life scientists might test, improve, and integrate cognitive and 
evolutionary models of religion.
Hypothesis 1: religion as minimally counterintuitive concepts
Many readers of this volume will be familiar with the “cognitive optimum” 
theory of religion (J. L. Barrett 2000; Slone 2004). "e theory holds that 
religious cultures persist because religious ideas are easily recalled and 
transmitted as minimally counterintuitive concepts (Boyer 1994a). "ough 
abstract theological treatises demand specialist casts of theological inter-
preters, the cognitive optimum theory claims that folk religions +ourish 
because religious concepts are slightly adjusted versions of ordinary con-
cepts. Such adjustments render religious concepts uncanny. Zeus is not 
merely a person, but rather an almighty, immortal person. Ganesh is also 
immortal, and moreover has an elephant’s head. St. Jude is a person who 
lives in a supernatural world—outside of place and time—but who can 
nevertheless hear our inner pleas for help, here and now.
Notice that if religions were best explained from the propagation of ideas 
that are minimally adjusted for uncanny memory formation, we would pre-
dict a tendency for cultural evolution to favor slight novelty. Moreover, 
such patterns of change in the transmission of religious concepts over time 
should be re+ected in historical signals. Good evidence for the cognitive 
optimum theory would come from observations along the following lines.
Zeus p Zeuus p Zuus p Suus p Sam p … Ricardo
"e rate of such change would, itself, be a matter of interest. One prospect 
is that transitions over time will be smooth, and regular. "ough as the 
transmission rate increases we might expect a steeper rate of change: more 
people, more conversations, more minimally counterintuitive adjustments. 
Another prospect is that every so often a big change is introduced and 
gains widespread in+uence (e.g., say “Ricardo”), which leads to a dramatic 
shift, or in the language of biology, to a “saltation.”
Of course, cognitive optimum theory and the charismatic model might 
be compatible. If so, we should expect oscillations, for which the bene!ts 
conserving the old tradition constrain an innovation that is nevertheless 
important for whetting interest:
Zeus p Zeuus p Zuus p Zues p Zeus p Zeuus p Zuus p Zues …
Currently, only collaborative teams of textual historical scholars and life 
scientists have the training by which to evaluate the cognitive optimum 
model, and to relate it to evolutionary models. Such historical experiments 
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lie on the horizons of current research (for initial interest see Geertz & 
Jensen 2011; Martin & Sørensen 2011).
Hypothesis 2: cultural selection favors moralizing high gods
A second popular theory of religion claims that cultural selection favors 
“high god” religious concepts because, by hypothesis, beliefs in Gods with 
moral intentions are more likely to forge solidarity. Religion-induced soli-
darity, on this model, leads to the defeat of low god cultures by high god 
cultures (Gervais et al. 2011). If the high god hypothesis were correct, then 
we would expect the historical record to show that high gods religions pre-
cede growth of large and complex societies, rather than the opposite, as in 
Figure 12.1.
Another prediction of the high god model is that high god religions 
should become increasingly common, such that over time:
Frequency of those who maintain low god religions < frequency 
of those who maintain high god religions
Figure 12.1 (a) A cultural phylogeny showing the absence (white circle) or 
presence (black circle) of social complexity, and the absence (white square) or 
presence (black square) of high gods. On this phylogeny social complexity evolved 
before high gods. (b) A hypothetical transition matrix of the evolution of high 
gods and social complexity. Arrows are proportional to the transition rate between 
states. "is matrix shows that gaining a high god only rarely leads to social 
complexity (arrow 7), but social complexity very often leads to the evolution of a 
high god (arrow 3).
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"e timing and rate of change for high god religions could be analyzed 
using cultural phylogenetics (indeed such studies are in the works; Gray & 
Greenhill 2011). Again we !nd that historical resources are needed to eval-
uate the high god model, and the distinction between a “high god” religion 
and a “low gods” attributed to the historical record. It is unclear whether 
any such distinction will survive analysis.
Hypothesis 3: charismatic calling models of religion
"e Charismatic Calling Model hypothesizes that religions evolve as 
“mortal gods” in Hobbes’s sense. Core features of religious cognition and 
cultures function as mechanisms that express and synchronize cooperative 
motivations in anonymous populations. "e model speci!cally predicts 
the evolution of ecologies that (1) a.ord strong motivational states (2) in 
synchrony among partners to risky trade. What historical signals might 
support the charismatic model? Consider four retrospective predictions:
 1 Religious cultures should tend to express generic cooperative moti-
vations, which do not depend on commitment signals, particularly 
in large social worlds where anonymous partners share a religion in 
common.
 2 Religious cultures should harbour otherwise impractical spatial and 
temporal designs that evoke cooperative states.
 3 Investment in the production and maintenance of such designs 
should increase with the risks of exchange.
 4 Core properties of religious cultures should be conserved with high 
!delity.
We believe that collaborative teams of historians of religion and life scien-
tists are required to test such predictions.
Notably, teams of textual-historical scholars and quantitative scholars 
have recently begun to evaluate cognitive and evolutionary models of reli-
gion (for example, see Czachesz & Biró 2011; Martin & Sørensen 2011; 
Slingerland & Chudek 2011). Such projects are part of a larger intellectual 
movement that is seeing biologists and historians teaming up to test, and 
to improve, models of social evolution (see for example Currie et al. 2010; 
Gray et al. 2009; Matthews 2012; Matthews et al. 2012; Turchin 2006). We 
believe that collaboration between historians of religion and life scientists 
will soon become standard practice in religious studies scholarship. "e 
advantages to understanding that such collaborative teamwork uniquely 
a.ords will continue to motivate the irrepressibly curious, whatever their 
departmental a/liations.
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